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Seventeen Years Since the Sunset: The
Expiration of 245(i) and Its Effect on U.S.
Citizens Married to Undocumented
Immigrants
Marisa S. Cianciarulo*
INTRODUCTION
One of the most pervasive myths of U.S. immigration law is
that marriage to a U.S. citizen confers citizenship, or at least
some form of legal status, upon a foreign national. It is an
intuitive notion: that a U.S. citizen enjoys, as part of his or her
package of privileges and protections, the right to live anywhere
in the United States with a spouse of his or her choosing, and to
confer automatically some form of legal status upon that spouse.
It comes as a surprise and an affront to many U.S. citizens that
their immigration laws do not always comport with this notion.
The fact is that no marriage-based adjustment of a foreign
national’s immigration status occurs automatically. A U.S.
citizen who wishes to confer permanent immigration status upon
his or her spouse must sponsor that spouse for lawful permanent
residency.1 If and when the petition is approved, the foreign
national spouse must then apply for adjustment of status to
lawful permanent residency (if in the United States)2 or an
immigrant visa (if outside the United States).3 Only after a
period of three years as a lawful permanent resident may the
foreign national spouse then apply for naturalization.4 While this
process is contrary to the intuitive notion of automatic conferral
of citizenship via marriage, it is nevertheless a relatively painless
and straightforward process for many families.

* Professor of Law, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law. Thanks to
Carrie Rosenbaum for helpful comments throughout the writing of this Article; Allison
Scott and Kristin Cavert for outstanding research assistance; and the Chapman Law
Review for inviting this Article and dedicating Volume 18, Issue 2 to the critical issue of
comprehensive immigration reform.
1 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a) (2012).
2 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).
3 8 U.S.C. § 1181(a).
4 8 U.S.C. § 1430.
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Significant problems arise, however, for families in which
the foreign national spouse entered the United States without
inspection. Under current immigration law, foreign nationals
who entered the United States without inspection5 are ineligible
to apply for lawful permanent residency in the United States,
irrespective of the existence of an approved petition submitted by
a U.S. citizen spouse.6 Such individuals must instead depart the
United States and apply for an immigrant visa abroad. This is
much more than an inconvenience involving travel and
temporary separation from loved ones. Another immigration
provision bars any foreign national who has been unlawfully
present in the United States for one year or longer from
reentering the United States for ten years upon his or her
departure from the United States.7 Only a waiver granted on
account of “extreme hardship” to the U.S. citizen spouse can
overcome the bar.8
The reentry bars were enacted in 1996 as part of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(“IIRIRA”),9 a sweeping immigration bill that sought to curtail
illegal immigration to the United States and to facilitate the
removal of noncitizens who commit crimes and administrative
violations. In addition to creating the reentry bars, IIRIRA
authorized increased personnel, fencing, and surveillance
equipment for the Border Patrol;10 amended the definition of an
“aggravated felony” to include more offenses that would subject a
noncitizen to permanent deportation;11 enhanced the process of
“expedited removal” by which an immigration officer may order a
person deemed inadmissible deported without a hearing or
supervisory review;12 restricted judicial review of several types of

5 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6) (designating as ineligible for visas or admission to the
United States “[a]n alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled,
or who arrives in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the
Attorney General”).
6 See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (limiting eligibility for adjustment of status to aliens who
were “inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States”).
7 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II).
8 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v).
9 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and 18
U.S.C.).
10 Id. §§ 101–103, 110 Stat. at 3009-553 to -555.
11 Id. § 321, 110 Stat. at 3009-627.
12 Id. § 302, 110 Stat. at 3009-579. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, enacted earlier the same year, created
the expedited removal process.
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immigration court decisions;13 and facilitated the increased
detention of certain noncitizens.14
Within two years of IIRIRA’s enactment, a temporary but
crucial provision found at section 245(i) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act expired.15 Section 245(i) allowed undocumented
immigrants who married U.S. citizens to adjust their status in
the United States rather than have to depart the United States
and apply for an immigrant visa abroad. When 245(i) expired on
January 14, 1998, undocumented spouses of U.S. citizens for
whom spousal petitions were filed after that date not only
became ineligible to adjust their status in the United States, but
also triggered a three- or ten-year bar on reentering the United
States as soon as they departed the country in order to apply for
an immigrant visa. Except for a brief reinstatement of 245(i)
from December 21, 2000 to April 30, 2001,16 undocumented
immigrant spouses of U.S. citizens have had to seek a waiver of
the three- and ten-year bars in order to receive an immigrant
visa.
This Article examines the rationale behind and effects of
IIRIRA with respect to the inadmissibility of undocumented
spouses of U.S. citizens. Part I explains the current framework
for spousal petitions and family-based immigration to the United
States. Part II reviews the political and immigration landscape
that gave rise to IIRIRA and the reentry bars. Part III details the
combined effects of the reentry bars and the unavailability of
245(i) upon the current generation of U.S. citizens seeking to
sponsor undocumented immigrant spouses. Part IV evaluates the
effects of the unavailability of 245(i), taking into account the
intended goals and the actual effects of the reentry bars, and
concludes that the unavailability of 245(i) for persons subject to
the reentry bars does not contribute to the objectives advanced in
support of IIRIRA. The Article concludes that truly
comprehensive immigration reform legislation must include a
permanent reinstatement of 245(i) for immediate relatives of
U.S. citizens.
I. THE ROCKY ROAD TO LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS
Another popular myth about U.S. immigration law is that in
order to obtain lawful permanent resident status, one must
13 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act § 306, 110 Stat. at
3009-607.
14 Id. §§ 303, 305, 110 Stat. at 3009-585, -597.
15 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) (2012).
16 Legal Immigration Family Equity Act, Pub. L. No. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762A-142
(2000).
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simply apply and wait in line for one’s turn to legalize. In reality,
immigration law strictly limits the ability to apply for lawful
permanent resident status to certain categories of individuals.17
Only certain family members sponsored by U.S. citizens and
lawful permanent residents,18 certain employment-based
immigrants,19 or other narrow categories of intending
immigrants20 are eligible to apply for lawful permanent resident
status. Most of those aspiring immigrants must wait for years in
quota-related backlogs to be able to apply for lawful permanent
resident status.21
One of the few categories of intending immigrants who
qualify as “immediate relatives” not subject to a quota is the
category of spouses of U.S. citizens.22 Nevertheless, as noted
above, a U.S. citizen’s conferral of permanent lawful immigration
status upon a foreign spouse is neither automatic nor
guaranteed.23 The citizen must sponsor the foreign spouse and
the foreign spouse must subsequently apply for lawful permanent
resident status. For foreign spouses who entered the United
States legally, the process is expensive and can be cumbersome,
but it is fairly straightforward. For foreign spouses who entered
the United States without inspection, however, the process
involves significantly more stress, time, and cost, and affects
17 See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (stating that only applicants with approved and
immediately available immigrant visas are eligible to apply for adjustment of status).
18 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a).
19 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b).
20 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c) (permitting the issuance of immigrant visas to
diversity immigrants, beneficiaries of a program popularly known as the “visa lottery”);
8 U.S.C. § 1255(l) (authorizing the adjustment of status for victims of trafficking who
were granted a visa under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)); 8 U.S.C. § 1159 (authorizing the
adjustment of status of refugees and asylees).
21 See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(c)–(e) (specifying the number of individuals who may become
lawful permanent residents each year pursuant to a relative petition, employment, and
the diversity visa program). The statutory quotas have resulted in long wait times for
some categories of immigrants. See Immigrant Numbers for June 2014, VISA BULL. (U.S.
Dep’t of State, Washington, D.C.), June 2014, at 2, available at http://travel.state.gov/con
tent/visas/english/law-and-policy/bulletin/2014/visa-bulletin-for-june-2014.html (reporting
that immigrant visas are currently available for adult unmarried sons and daughters of
U.S. citizens whose petitions were filed on or before March 22, 2007 (seven-year delay);
adult unmarried children of permanent residents whose petitions were filed on or before
April 1, 2007 (seven-year delay); married sons and daughters whose petitions were filed
on or before October 1, 2003 (eleven-year delay); and siblings of U.S. citizens whose
petitions were filed on or before December 15, 2001 (thirteen-year delay)). The delays are
significantly longer for nationals of Mexico and the Philippines. For example, immigrant
visas are not available for Filipino siblings of U.S. citizens whose petitions were filed after
November 15, 1990, a twenty-four-year delay. Id.
22 See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (classifying children, spouses, and parents of U.S.
citizens as immediate relatives not subject to statutory numerical limitations).
23 It is also not free. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.7(b)(1)(i)(L) (2014) (stating that the filing fee
for a spousal petition is $420); 8 C.F.R. § 103.7(b)(1)(i)(U)(1) (stating that the filing fee for
an application to adjust status is $985 for applicants age fourteen or older).
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careers and fundamental family matters such as having and
raising children.
A. On the Same Path: Petitioning for the Alien Spouse
Regardless of the immigration status of the foreign spouse,
conferring lawful immigration status upon that spouse begins
with the U.S. citizen filing a “Petition for Alien Relative.”24 The
petition must include evidence of the petitioner’s U.S. citizenship,
a marriage certificate, passport-style photos of the petitioner and
beneficiary, proof of termination of any previous marriages,25 and
a $420 fee.26 Unless the foreign spouse is in removal proceedings
or has past immigration violations or criminal convictions,27 this
is a fairly simple process in which the U.S. citizen in effect
requests that the U.S. government recognize his or her marriage
to a foreign national and allow the foreign spouse to apply for
lawful permanent resident status.28 An approved petition
provides the basis for applying for adjustment of status if the
foreign spouse is eligible for adjustment.29
It is at this point that the road divides. Foreign spouses who
entered legally may apply for adjustment of status, regardless of
their current immigration status.30 Foreign spouses who entered
without inspection are ineligible for adjustment of status and
must seek an immigrant visa through the consular processing
system.

8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a)(1).
8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(2).
8 C.F.R. § 103.7(b)(1)(i)(L).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(g) (prohibiting the approval of a marriage entered into while
the foreign spouse was in removal proceedings, unless the foreign spouse resides outside
the United States for two years after the date of marriage or proves that the marriage is
bona fide); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1255(e)(3) (requiring that the foreign spouse who married
while in removal proceedings prove that the marriage was entered into in good faith and
not “for the purpose of procuring the alien’s admission as an immigrant”).
28 See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (classifying spouses of U.S. citizens as immediate
relatives who are eligible to apply for adjustment of status upon approval of the spousal
petition). The regulations governing the process state that “a petitioner . . . [or] a
beneficiary . . . residing in the United States at the time of filing an [application or
petition] may be required to appear for . . . an interview.” 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(9).
29 A petition will only be denied if the eligibility requirements are not proven or the
marriage is deemed fraudulent. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(1) (requiring that the petitioner
establish eligibility at the time of filing the petition); 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c) (prohibiting the
approval of spousal petitions in cases in which the foreign spouse “has attempted or
conspired to enter into a marriage for the purpose of evading the immigration laws”).
Sponsors and beneficiaries may also be required to attend an interview. 8 C.F.R.
§ 103.2(b)(9). A beneficiary married to his or her spouse for less than two years at the
time that adjustment is granted is subject to conditional residency, and must seek to have
the conditions removed before being granted unconditional lawful permanent residency.
8 U.S.C. § 1186a.
30 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).
24
25
26
27
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B. The Paths Diverge: Consular Processing and Bars to
Admissibility
Immigration law requires that an adjustment applicant have
entered the United States legally, but does not require that the
applicant have maintained his or her lawful status. An applicant
who has been sponsored by a U.S. citizen spouse is exempt from
the provision that prohibits individuals who are in unlawful
immigration status or who have worked without authorization
from adjusting their status.31 Moreover, although a foreign
spouse outside the United States can be barred from reentry if he
or she was ever unlawfully present in the United States, a
foreign spouse who entered legally is eligible to adjust his or her
status without ever leaving the United States.32
This is the point at which the situation becomes drastically
different for a foreign spouse who entered the United States
without inspection. Adjustment of status is only available to
applicants who have been “inspected and admitted or paroled
into the United States.”33 Thus, the only way for a foreign spouse
who entered without inspection to obtain lawful permanent
resident status pursuant to an approved petition by a U.S. citizen
is to depart the United States and apply for an immigrant visa
abroad through the consular processing system.
Consular processing involves more than the inconvenience
and expense of traveling abroad to obtain an immigrant visa.
When a noncitizen leaves the United States, she or he must
apply for admission in order to reenter the United States,
irrespective of family ties to U.S. citizens. A noncitizen who
departs the United States thus becomes subject to various
grounds of inadmissibility that can prevent her or him from
returning to the United States. An undocumented immigrant
who entered without inspection and lived in the United States as
an adult for six months or longer is inadmissible for a period of
three years;34 an undocumented immigrant who entered without

31 See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c) (rendering ineligible for adjustment of status an applicant
who “continues in or accepts unauthorized employment prior to filing an application for
adjustment of status or who is in unlawful immigration status on the date of filing the
application for adjustment of status or who has failed . . . to maintain continuously a
lawful status since entry into the United States,” unless the applicant qualifies for
adjustment as the spouse of a U.S. citizen or other specified category).
32 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).
33 Id.
34 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I).
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inspection and lived in the United States for one year or longer is
inadmissible for a period of ten years.35
In order for the undocumented immigrant to overcome the
three- or ten-year bar on reentry, he or she must apply for a
waiver.36 Discussed more fully below, the waiver process is
fraught with anxiety and uncertainty. A family that has already
spent considerable time and money to complete the petitioning
process with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
(“USCIS”) must now pay an additional fee and contend with an
additional branch of the U.S. government: the State Department.
Failure to obtain a waiver could result in indefinite
undocumented status at best, and prolonged separation at worst.
C. A Treacherous Route: The Waiver Process
Applicants seeking a waiver of the three- or ten-year bar
must prove that the reentry bar will result in extreme hardship
to the U.S. citizen spouse who sponsored him or her.37 USCIS
officers adjudicating waiver applications must consider the U.S.
citizen’s family ties or absence thereof in the country to which
she or he would have to relocate, the conditions in the country of
relocation, the financial impact of having to depart the United
States, and the U.S. citizen’s health and ability to receive
adequate medical care in the country of relocation.38 The statute
does not permit consideration of extreme hardship to U.S. citizen
children.39
Until March of 2013, the waiver could not be filed until the
undocumented spouse departed the United States.40 Thus, since
the expiration of 245(i) in 1998, U.S. citizens whose spouses are
seeking a waiver of the reentry bar have had to wait for the
decision while their undocumented spouses reside outside the
United States. Often, this results in a separation of many months
and even years.41 Only upon approval of the waiver is the
previously undocumented spouse permitted to enter the United
States as a lawful permanent resident. Moreover, there is no
guarantee that the waiver will be granted; approval rates vary

35 Immigration
and
Nationality
Act
§
212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II),
8
U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II).
36 Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(9)(B)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v).
37 Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(9)(B)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v).
38 Cervantes-Gonzales, 22 I. & N. Dec. 560 (B.I.A. 1999).
39 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v).
40 Provisional Unlawful Presence Waivers of Inadmissibility for Certain Immediate
Relatives, 78 Fed. Reg. 536, 536 (Jan. 3, 2013) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 103 and 212).
41 See id.
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dramatically among the various U.S. consulates.42 The effect that
this situation has had on numerous families is well
documented.43
On March 4, 2013, USCIS implemented a new process called
a “provisional waiver” for spouses and other immediate relatives
of U.S. citizens whose only ground of inadmissibility is unlawful
presence.44 This process allows the relative to seek a waiver
before leaving the United States to apply for his or her
immigrant visa. If the waiver is granted, the undocumented
spouse may then depart the United States and apply for
admission as a lawful permanent resident.45
Although this process is a welcome change that considerably
shortens the length of separation for families, it is not an
adequate substitute for the permanent reinstatement of 245(i). If
the undocumented spouse cannot prove extreme hardship, or if
there are any other possible grounds of inadmissibility that apply
to the undocumented spouse, the family has no recourse but to
endure a lengthy separation or residence outside the United
States while the undocumented spouse pursues a waiver through
the regular process. Even if the waiver is granted provisionally, it
is not a guarantee that the undocumented spouse will not be
delayed abroad. Applying for an immigrant visa entails a number
of complex and expensive steps, including obtaining a medical
exam from a U.S. government-approved physician, which prolong
the process and increase the chances of a lengthy separation.46
Moreover, the applicant might have other grounds of
42 See I-601 Waivers of Inadmissibility: Does the Current Process Work? When Is
Hardship Extreme? Do Alternative Models Exist?, U.S. DEPARTMENT HOMELAND SECURITY
(June 29, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/i-601-waivers-inadmissibility-does-current-processwork-when-hardship-extreme-do-alternative-models (“I-601 approval rates for FY 2011
international offices were 54% in the Bangkok District, 50% in the Rome District, and
84% in the Mexico District.”).
43 See Cain W. Oulahan, The American Dream Deferred: Family Separation and
Immigrant Visa Adjudications at U.S. Consulates Abroad, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1351,
1354 −55, 1370–71 (2011) (describing the impact that the reentry bars have had on
mixed-status families); IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., SO C LOSE AND YET SO FAR: H OW THE
THREE- AND TEN-YEAR BARS KEEP FAMILIES APART 3 (2011), available at
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/3_and_10_year_bars_072511.pdf
(noting that the vast majority of applicants seeking waivers do so at the U.S. consulate in
Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, where violent crime is so rampant that the U.S. Department of
State has issued a travel advisory warning against travel there).
44 Provisional Unlawful Presence Waivers of Inadmissibility, 78 Fed. Reg. at 536.
45 See id.
46 See IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., supra note 43 (“An applicant must first meet with
a consular officer from the Department of State (DOS), be told that a waiver is required,
wait for the case to be referred, obtain and wait for the appointment with USCIS, wait for
the adjudication, and then get a new appointment with DOS if the adjudication is
granted. Current wait times for the initial appointment with USCIS are 2 to 3 months,
meaning that even under the best of circumstances, an applicant will have to be outside
the U.S. for at least 3 months.”).
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inadmissibility of which she or he was not previously aware, and
which trigger the reentry bars, effectively negating the
provisional waiver.47
From a purely philosophical perspective, it would seem that
the law should give more weight and respect to the fundamental
life choices of the U.S. citizen than to the manner of entry of the
foreign spouse. And yet, the opposite is true: the law places
enormous stress and burdens on U.S. citizens married to
undocumented immigrants and on the U.S. citizen children of
those unions. The next section explains why the law became
focused on the foreign spouse’s manner of entry at the expense of
respect for U.S. citizens, family unity, and fundamental life
choices.
II. ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION REFORM AND IMMIGRANT
RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1996
The 1970s and 1980s saw a significant increase in
unauthorized immigration to the United States. Approximately
540,000 undocumented immigrants arrived in the 1960s,48
presumably to fill labor shortages that persisted after a
guest-worker program known as the Bracero Program ended in
1964.49 That number increased to 941,000 illegal entries between
1975 and 1980.50 By 1980, the undocumented population
exceeded 2 million.51
Throughout this period of increasing unauthorized
immigration, Congress passed laws attempting to address and
control it.52 Nevertheless, the 1990s saw a significant and rapid
increase in unauthorized immigration. By 1992, the United
See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012) (enumerating the various grounds of inadmissibility).
Robert Warren & Jeffrey S. Passel, A Count of the Uncountable: Estimates of
Undocumented Aliens Counted in the 1980 United States Census, 24 DEMOGRAPHY 375,
380 tbl.2 (1987).
49 The Bracero Program was a temporary guest-worker program in place from 1942
to 1964 intended to fill agricultural labor shortages resulting from World War II. For a
thorough description of the program and its effects on future Mexican immigration to the
United States, see generally RONALD L. MIZE & ALICIA C.S. SWORDS, CONSUMING
MEXICAN LABOR: FROM THE BRACERO PROGRAM TO NAFTA (2011).
50 Warren & Passel, supra note 48.
51 Id.
52 See, e.g., Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100
Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (increasing the number
of border patrol personnel, imposing sanctions on employers hiring immigrants
unauthorized to work in the United States, and creating legalization programs for
undocumented immigrants who meet certain requirements); Immigration Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.
and 28 U.S.C.) (increasing legal admissions, particularly for employment-based
immigrants and temporary workers; expanding the definition of “aggravated felony”; and
eliminating judicial sentencing recommendations against deportation).
47
48
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States was home to an estimated 3.4 million undocumented
immigrants; the undocumented population reached 5 million by
1996.53 In response to what were perceived as failed laws and
policies, and increasing hostility towards undocumented
immigrants at the state level, Congress passed the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.
A. Immigration Landscape in 1996
As unauthorized immigration to the United States increased
in the 1990s, hostility towards undocumented immigrants rose
proportionally. Although discrimination against and fear of
immigrants had long been a reality in the United States, the
phenomenon of illegal immigration endowed anti-immigrant
sentiment with a new purpose and sense of righteousness.
According to immigration restrictionists, anti-immigrant
sentiment was not race- or national origin-based discrimination;
it was a logical response to unlawful actions that were having a
significant economic impact on states and localities.54
California’s Proposition 187 is emblematic of the state and
local response to unprecedented levels of unauthorized
immigration to the United States. Proposition 187, a 1994 ballot
initiative nicknamed “Save Our State,” received the support of
fifty-nine percent of California voters.55 Its major provisions
included denying public education to undocumented children
from kindergarten through university, requiring public schools to
verify the legal status of students and their parents, denying
publicly funded non-emergency medical care to undocumented
immigrants (including prenatal care and long-term nursing care,
which were among the first services that then Governor Pete

53 OFFICE OF POLICY & STRATEGY, U.S. C ITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., THE
TRIENNIAL COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ON IMMIGRATION 39 (1997), available at
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/tri3f
ullreport.pdf.
54 See Quotes from Contemporary Public Officials, FED ’N FOR AM. IMMIGR. R EFORM,
http://www.fairus.org/facts/contemporary-public-officials (last visited Sept. 26, 2014)
(February 1994 statement of Los Angeles County Supervisor Michael D. Antonovich)
(“The question taxpayers keep asking is ‘why should we pay for services for those who
have broken the law to get here?’ They should not, nor should they be forced to be the
Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) and School District of the world. This is
evidenced in every poll I have seen indicating that every ethnic group is opposed to illegal
immigration and supports enforcement of the law.”); id. (May 6, 1995 statement of
President Bill Clinton in weekly radio address) (“[Illegal immigration] costs the taxpayers
of the United States a lot of money. And it’s unfair to Americans who are working every
day to pay their own bills. It’s also unfair to a lot of people who have waited in line for
years and years in other countries to be legal immigrants.”).
55 Prop. 187 Approved in California, MIGRATION NEWS (Univ. Cal. Davis, Davis,
Cal.), Dec. 1994, available at https://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=492_0_2_0.
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Wilson ordered denied to undocumented immigrants),56 and
requiring state service providers to report suspected
undocumented immigrants to the police and federal immigration
authorities.57 Referring to the initiative as “the first giant stride
in ultimately ending the ILLEGAL ALIEN invasion,” proponents
saw the measure as a means to counteract the alleged “magnets”
for unauthorized immigration: “[w]elfare, medical and
educational benefits.”58
In California and around the country, proponents of
restrictive state measures targeting undocumented immigrants
cited fiscal concerns, federal inaction, and sovereignty.
Proposition 187 supporters, Pat Buchanan, and others decried
the “alien invasion” of undocumented immigrants.59 Pete Wilson,
Newt Gingrich, and other federal and state lawmakers criticized
the federal government for creating the situation that led to high
rates of unauthorized immigration, failing to rectify it, and
refusing to compensate states for the cost of dealing with it.60
The Clinton Administration responded with a flurry of
actions designed to show that it was “tough on illegal
immigration.” Attorney General Janet Reno oversaw the
implementation of Operation Gatekeeper, which increased border
security and overhauled border enforcement strategies,61 and
ultimately had the effect of increasing unauthorized immigration

Id.
California Proposition 187: Illegal Aliens. Ineligibility for Public Services.
Verification and Reporting 51, 92 (1994), available at http://repository.uchastings.edu/ca_
ballot_props/1104.
58 Id. at 54; see also id. (“The federal government and the state government have
been derelict in their duty to control our borders. It is the role of our government to end
the benefits that draw people from around the world who ILLEGALLY enter our country.
Our government actually entices them.”).
59 See, e.g., Arthur Brice, Immigration: One Candidate Grabs Issue: Buchanan Fears
Dark Tide to Sink U.S., ATLANTA J. & CONST., Mar. 6, 1992, at B1 (quoting Pat
Buchanan) (“Does this First World nation wish to become a Third World country? Because
that is our destiny, if we do not build a sea wall against the waves of immigration rolling
over our shores.”).
60 See, e.g., 104 CONG. REC. 24,817 (1996) (statement of Rep. Newt Gingrich) (“[H]ow
can any Member [of Congress] walk on this floor, deny the citizens of California the right
to implement proposition 187, without expecting California to come right back here and
ask for $3 billion from the Federal Government annually to pay California for the cost of a
Federal failure?”); Greg Krikorian & Dave Lesher, Huffington Declares Support for Prop.
187, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1994, at A1 (quoting Republican Senate candidate Mike
Huffington) (“It’s time to send a message to those illegal immigrants who disregard our
laws and take advantage of our government’s misplaced generosity. Equally important, it
is high time we send a message to Washington. The taxpayers of California are sick and
tired of paying for Washington’s federally imposed mandates while Washington ignores
their federal responsibility at the border.”).
61 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., OPERATION
GATEKEEPER: AN INVESTIGATION INTO ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD AND MISCONDUCT (1998),
available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/9807/gkp01.htm#P203_31548.
56
57
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as well as increasing its attendant deaths and injuries.62
Attorney General Reno also created the position of “border czar,”
appointing U.S. Attorney Alan Bersin to the post in October
1995.63 Finally, President Clinton signed into law the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
which contained a number of restrictive immigration provisions,
including the three- and ten-year reentry bars currently in
place.64 The legislation came into effect just as section 245(i) was
about to expire.
B. The Rise of the Reentry Bars and the Sunsetting of 245(i)
Congress had passed 245(i) as a temporary measure in
1994.65 According to the Senate Appropriations Committee,
requiring undocumented immigrants to go abroad in order to
obtain an immigrant visa “was originally designed to dissuade
aliens from circumventing normal visa requirements, [but] has
not provided the intended deterrent effect and merely creates
consular workload overseas.”66 Persons seeking to adjust under
245(i) had to pay the “normal fee for adjustment of status, plus
an additional fee”67 that was originally $650 and was later
increased to $1000 under IIRIRA.68 Section 245(i) was set to
expire in October 1997, but in November 1997 Congress extended
62 See Bill Ong Hing, NAFTA, Globalization, and Mexican Migrants, 5 J.L.
ECON. & POL’Y 87, 131–32 (2009) (“Operation Gatekeeper has not stopped the flow of
border crossers, but it has made crossing more dangerous. Gatekeeper and the increased
militarizing of the border have ironically curtailed one thing: circularity. Mexican
seasonal workers commonly traveled back and forth across the border because their
families often remained in Mexico. But now the number of undocumented migrants who
actually want to return to Mexico has been reduced. Given the difficulty in crossing into
the United States, once many undocumented persons arrive, they remain to work and
may even look for family members to join them. This has contributed to the increase in
the undocumented population in the United States.”); see also MARIA JIMENEZ, ACLU OF
SAN DIEGO & IMPERIAL CNTYS. & MEXICO ’S NAT ’L COMM ’N OF HUMAN RIGHTS ,
HUMANITARIAN CRISIS : MIGRANT DEATHS AT THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER 17 (2009)
(reporting a low incidence of border-crossing deaths in 1994 (estimates vary from 0 to 23)
and a steady increase after the implementation of Operation Gatekeeper (estimates vary
from 329 to 827 in specific fiscal years)); U.S. BORDER PATROL, SOUTHWEST BORDER
DEATHS BY F ISCAL YEAR, available at http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
U.S.%20Border%20Patrol%20Fiscal%20Year%20Statistics%20SWB%20Sector%20Deaths
%20FY1998%20-%20FY2013.pdf (demonstrating an increase in border deaths from 263 in
1998 to 445 in 2013—down only slightly from 477 in 2012).
63 Sebastian Rotella, Reno Names Prosecutor as “Border Czar”, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 14,
1995, at A1.
64 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and 18
U.S.C.).
65 ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31373, IMMIGRATION: ADJUSTMENT
TO PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS UNDER SECTION 245(i), at 1 (2002).
66 S. REP. NO. 103-309, at 134 (1994).
67 Id.
68 BRUNO, supra note 65, at 3–4.
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the deadline to January 14, 1998.69 Notably, the Senate version
of the legislation that extended the deadline included a
permanent reinstatement of 245(i).70
The enactment of 245(i) and, likely, its temporary duration,
led to a significant increase in applications for adjustment of
status. Prior to 1995, the government typically had
approximately 120,000 pending applications for adjustment of
status.71 By 1995, that number had jumped to 321,000.72 By the
end of 1997, when 245(i) was close to expiring, the government
had 699,000 pending applications for adjustment of status.73
Although the government does not report how many of those
applications were the result of approved spousal petitions by U.S.
citizens for undocumented spouses, the government attributes
the increase to 245(i).74
The enactment of the three- and ten-year reentry bars in
1996 brought a new level of significance to the imminent
expiration of 245(i). Prior to the enactment of 245(i),
undocumented immigrant spouses of U.S. citizens merely faced
the inconvenience of consular processing; now they would face a
three- or ten-year bar to reentry as well. The expiration of 245(i)
meant that undocumented immigrants whose U.S. citizen
spouses submitted petitions for them after January 14, 1998
would be ineligible for adjustment of status and would need to
apply for an immigrant visa abroad and petition for a waiver of
the three- or ten-year bar. Not surprisingly, 1998 and 1999 saw a
decrease in the number of applications for lawful permanent
residence.75
The numbers of applications filed increased again in 2001
when 245(i) was briefly reinstated as part of the Legal
Immigration Family Equity Act of 2000.76 The number of
applications approved in 2001 was 653,259,77 up from 442,405 in

69 Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, sec. 111 (a)–(b), §§ 245(i)(1),
506(c), 11 Stat. 2440, 2458 (1997) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1255, 1182 (2012)).
70 BRUNO, supra note 65, at 4.
71 IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1997 STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 17 (1999).
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP ’T OF JUSTICE, 1999 STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 15 (2002).
76 Legal Immigration Family Equity Act, Pub. L. No. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762A-142
(2000); LIFE Act Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A-324.
77 IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE , 2001
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 13 (2003).
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2000.78 Although, as noted above, the government does not report
the underlying bases for the adjustment applications, a 2004
memo from the Associate Director of USCIS Operations provides
USCIS personnel with guidance on dealing with “the significant
increase in [petition] filings at Service Centers immediately
preceding the April 30, 2001 sunset date contained in Section
245(i).”79
One might safely assume, given the increase in petitions and
applications for adjustment of status during periods when 245(i)
was in effect, that many families co-headed by an undocumented
immigrant spouse declined to pursue the legalization of the
undocumented spouse when doing so would place the spouse in
danger of being denied entry to the United States for many years.
In fact, the number of families seeking provisional waivers since
that option became available in March of 2013 gives some
indication of how many U.S. families have been affected by the
absence of 245(i): in the first seven months of the program,
USCIS received nearly 24,000 applications for provisional
waivers.80
The next section will discuss whether IIRIRA’s reentry bars
have served their intended purpose.
III. NINETEEN YEARS AFTER IIRIRA: TODAY’S IMMIGRATION
LANDSCAPE
A number of facts indicate that IIRIRA has failed to achieve
its primary goal of reducing unauthorized immigration to the
United States and that the reentry bars serve only to make
legalization more onerous for arguably some of the most
deserving of undocumented immigrants: those married to U.S.
citizens. First, the number of undocumented immigrants present
in the United States has increased significantly since 1996, a
response to economic factors that exist completely independently
of any domestic immigration legislation. Second, states and
localities are so dissatisfied with immigration law and
enforcement that the United States has seen a resurgence of
state attempts to punish or protect undocumented immigrants,
depending on the culture and politics of the particular state.
Finally, the United States is now home to an estimated
78 IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP ’T OF JUSTICE, 2000 STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 14 (2002).
79 Interoffice Memorandum from Michael R. Yates, Assoc. Dir., USCIS Operations,
to USCIS Reg’l Dirs. et al. (Apr. 22, 2004) (on file with the Chapman Law Review),
available at http://www.avlawoffice.com/YatesMemoPendingI130.htm.
80 U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: USCIS
MEETING WITH THE AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOCIATION (AILA) 3 (2013).

Do Not Delete

2015]

2/15/2015 8:56 PM

Seventeen Years Since the Sunset

465

1.7 million undocumented immigrant children and young adults
who did not enter the United States of their own volition but
because their parents brought them;81 it would seem that the
deterrent effect of IIRIRA’s reentry bars have been particularly
ineffective with respect to that group of undocumented
immigrants.
A. The Fluctuating Rate of Illegal Immigration to the United
States
IIRIRA was predicated on the theory that undocumented
immigrants respond to deterrence and punitive measures, and
that generous immigration provisions serve only to encourage
unauthorized immigration. What was true in 1996, however,
remains true today: economics is the principle driving force
behind migration. Consequently, the rate of illegal immigration
to the United States has continued to respond to economic factors
rather than laws. As economist Gordon Hanson has stated:
Inflows of illegal immigrants tend to be highly sensitive to economic
conditions, with inflows rising during periods when the U.S. economy
is expanding and Mexico’s is contracting. Examining month-to-month
changes in apprehensions of illegal immigrants attempting to cross
the U.S.-Mexico border reveals that when Mexican wages fall by
10 percent relative to U.S. wages, attempts at illegal entry increase by
6 percent. The responsiveness of illegal immigration to economic
conditions is to be expected. These individuals come to the United
States seeking work and their incentive to do so is strongest when the
difference in job prospects on the two sides of the border is greatest.
The illegal immigrant population is also quite mobile geographically
within the United States. During the 1990s, U.S. job growth was
strongest in mountain states and the southeast. These states also
registered the largest percentage increases in the number of illegal
immigrants.82

Other prominent law and economics scholars concur that
economics, more than any other factor, drives immigration. The
research of Dean Kevin Johnson, Professor Bill Ong Hing, and
others83 conclusively demonstrates that “immigrants, generally
81 JEFFREY S. PASSEL & MARK HUGO LOPEZ , PEW H ISPANIC CTR., UP TO 1.7 M ILLION
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT YOUTH MAY BENEFIT FROM NEW DEPORTATION RULES 3
(2012).
82 GORDON H. HANSON, THE ECONOMIC LOGIC OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION 12 (Council
on Foreign Relations, Council Special Report No. 26, 2007).
83 See generally Donald J. Boudreaux, Some Basic Economics of Immigration, 5 J.L.
ECON. & POL’Y 199, 199–200 (2009); Hing, supra note 62 (examining the laws and
economic factors on both sides of the Mexico/U.S. border that influence migration); Kevin
R. Johnson, It’s the Economy, Stupid: The Hijacking of the Debate Over Immigration
Reform by Monsters, Ghosts, and Goblins (or the War on Drugs, War on Terror,
Narcoterrorists, Etc.), 13 CHAP. L. REV. 583, 587 (2010) (“[M]ost immigration is connected,
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speaking, historically have been attracted by the economic
opportunities that exist in this country.”84 More than that,
however, economics on both sides of the border—often created by
economic policies that benefit the United States and harm its
neighbors85—are tremendous push and pull factors that create
high demand for unauthorized migration.86
Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that an immigration law
regime focused on individual migrants rather than the economic
conditions that drive migration has proven ineffective. The
dissatisfaction with current immigration law is at its most
intense in states and localities critical of federal efforts. The next
section discusses state attempts to correct perceived flaws with
federal immigration law and enforcement.
B. States’ Frustration with the Lack of Effective Immigration
Laws
States and localities quickly became aware that IIRIRA,
despite its sweeping provisions, was not living up to its potential.
Some believe that the legislation itself is sufficient, but that the
government is not effectively enforcing it; those states have

directly or indirectly, to labor migration of individuals and families and the relative
economic opportunity in the United States.”); Douglas S. Massey et al., An Evaluation of
International Migration Theory: The North American Case, 20 POPULATION & DEV. REV .
699, 710 (1994) (reviewing numerous migration studies and concluding that “the
accumulated empirical evidence generally supports neoclassical theory’s fundamental
proposition that immigration is tied to international differences in wage rates”).
84 Johnson, supra note 83, at 601.
85 See Hing, supra note 62, at 98–99 (explaining how the failure of NAFTA and the
proliferation of U.S. farm subsidies have increased poverty rates in Mexico); id. (“For
years, Mexico provided support to rural areas through systems of price supports for
producers and reduced prices of agricultural products for consumers, but after NAFTA,
Mexico withdrew this support. The United States, however, continued to produce
subsidized corn in huge quantities at low prices, undercutting Mexico’s corn prices; this
subsidized system displaced Mexican workers because corn was a major source of rural
income. At best, the effects of NAFTA in Mexico have been uneven, especially in rural
areas and among low-skilled groups that tend to migrate to the United States. The wages
for low-wage workers have declined, and the rural poverty rate has increased. The idea of
NAFTA-created jobs that would reduce pressure to migrate simply has not become a
reality.”).
86 See Douglas S. Massey, Five Myths About Immigration: Common Misconceptions
Underlying U.S. Border-Enforcement Policy, IMMIGR. POL ’Y FOCUS, Aug. 2005, at 1, 5–7
(“[H]ouseholds use international migration as a tool to overcome failed or missing
markets at home. Mexico, in particular, lacks well-developed markets for insurance,
capital, and credit . . . . Mexico has virtually no mortgage banking industry.”); see also
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 2 (1995) (statement of Barbara Jordan, Chair, U.S. Comm. on
Immigration Reform) (“[W]e must face the fact that unilateral action on the part of the
United States will never be enough to curb illegal immigration. Immigrants come here
illegally from source countries where conditions prevail that encourage or even compel
them to leave. Attacking the root causes of illegal migration is essential and will require
international cooperation.”).
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enacted laws that attempt to augment or effectuate the
enforcement provisions of IIRIRA. Others find the current laws
to be unreasonably and counterproductively harsh towards
undocumented immigrants and seek to assure undocumented
immigrants that they will enjoy some protections and benefits in
those states. The National Conference of State Legislatures
reports that since 2007, an average of 1300 state
immigration-related bills are introduced per year and an average
of 200 are enacted.87 Both types of state laws send a similar
message to the federal government: current immigration laws are
not working.
1. The Restrictive Model
States seeking to fill a perceived federal inability to reduce
unauthorized immigration to the United States have passed laws
similar to California’s Proposition 187 and other measures
popular in the 1990s. Provisions include barring undocumented
immigrants from eligibility for in-state tuition at public colleges
and universities;88 enforcing federal restrictions on the
employment of undocumented immigrants;89 requiring law
87 ANN MORSE ET AL., NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2013
IMMIGRATION REPORT 2 (2013).
88 See, e.g., S. Con. Res. 1031, 47th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., 2007 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1567,
1569 (prohibiting in-state tuition for undocumented students); S.B. 492, 149th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2008 Ga. Laws 759, 761 (same); H.B. 1402, 117th Gen. Assemb., 1st
Reg. Sess., 2011 Ind. Acts 2790, 2790 (same); H.B. 153, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.,
2011 Ohio Laws 1436, 1438 (same); H.B. 4400, 117th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2008 S.C.
Acts 2325, 2354 (prohibiting undocumented students from attending public institutions of
higher learning and from receiving in-state tuition).
89 See, e.g., H.B. 56, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess., 2011 Ala. Acts 888, 910–11 (requiring
employers to comply with E-Verify, a federal system for ascertaining employment
authorization); H.B. 2779, 48th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 2007 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1312, 1313
(prohibiting employers from employing immigrants unauthorized to work in the United
States); H.B. 1343, 65th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess., 2006 Colo. Sess. Laws 1694, 1695
(prohibiting state agencies from entering into contract agreements with contractors who
knowingly employ unauthorized immigrants); Fla. Exec. Order No. 11-116 (May 27, 2011)
(requiring state agencies as well as contractors and subcontractors who have contracts
“for the provision of goods or services to the state in excess of nominal value” to use
E-Verify); H.B. 2, 150th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2009 Ga. Laws 970, 971 (requiring
public employers to use E-Verify); H.B. 87, 151st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2011 Ga. Laws
794, 808 (requiring certain private employers to use E-Verify); Idaho Exec. Order No.
2009-10 (May 29, 2009) (requiring companies with state contracts to verify the
employment authorization of their workers); S.B. 590, 117th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess.,
2011 Ind. Acts 1926, 1959–62 (requiring state agencies, political subdivisions, contractors
with public contracts, and certain business entities to use E-Verify); H.B. 646, 2011 Leg.,
Reg. Sess., 2011 La. Acts 2046, 2046–47 (requiring all private businesses to use E-Verify
or maintain records of proof of eligibility to work in the United States); H.B. 5365, 96th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2012) (requiring contractors and subcontractors working on certain
state transportation projects to use E-Verify); S.B. 2988, 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess., 2008 Miss.
Laws 386, 387 (requiring public and private employers to use E-Verify); H.B. 1549, 94th
Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess., 2008 Mo. Laws 291, 296–97 (requiring public agencies,
contractors, and subcontractors to use E-Verify); L.B. 403, 101st Leg., 1st Sess., 2009 Neb.
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enforcement officers to attempt to ascertain the immigration
status of individuals involved in a lawful stop;90 penalizing the
harboring and transporting of undocumented immigrants,
without exceptions for mixed-status family members who live
and travel together;91 and imposing penalties on employers who
hire undocumented immigrants and property owners who rent to
them.92
The National Conference of State Legislatures reports that,
presumably in response to the negative reception punitive

Laws 788, 789 (requiring all public employers and contractors to use E-Verify); H.B. 36,
2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 975, 976–78 (requiring private
employers to use E-Verify and requiring public employers to comply with federal
employment authorization verification requirements); H.B. 1804, 51st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.,
2007 Okla. Sess. Laws 545, 549 (requiring public employers, contractors, and
subcontractors to use E-Verify); S.B. 637, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2012 Pa. Laws
1086, 1086 (requiring public contractors and subcontractors to use E-Verify); H.B. 4400,
117th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2008 S.C. Acts 2325, 2331–34 (requiring public and
certain private employers to use E-Verify); H.B. 1378, 107th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Tenn. 2011) (requiring employers to use E-Verify); S.B. 81, 57th Leg., Gen. Sess., 2008
Utah Laws 746, 750–51 (requiring public employers to use E-Verify); S.B. 251, 58th Leg.,
Gen. Sess., 2010 Utah Laws 2733, 2733–34 (requiring private employers to use E-Verify);
H.B. 737, 2010 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2010 Va. Acts 1144, 1144 (requiring state
agencies to use E-Verify); S.B. 659, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2012) (requiring use of
E-Verify for new employees working on the premises of the Capitol Complex).
90 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT . ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2014) (West) (requiring law
enforcement officers making a lawful stop, detention, or arrest to make a reasonable
attempt to determine the immigration status of the person if reasonable suspicion exists
that the person is unlawfully present in the United States); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-5-100(b)
(2014) (requiring law enforcement officers investigating a criminal suspect to seek to
verify the suspect’s immigration status if the suspect is unable to provide proof of lawful
status); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-13-170(A) (2013) (requiring law enforcement officers making
a lawful stop, detention, or arrest to make a reasonable attempt to determine the
immigration status of the person if reasonable suspicion exists that the person is
unlawfully present in the United States).
91 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 446(A)–(B) (2014) (making it a criminal offense “for
any person to transport, move, or attempt to transport in the State of Oklahoma any alien
knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that the alien has come to, entered, or
remained in the United States in violation of law,” or to “conceal, harbor, or shelter from
detection any alien in any place within the State of Oklahoma, including any building or
means of transportation, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that the alien has
come to, entered, or remained in the United States in violation of law”); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-11-200, -201 (2014) (subjecting to criminal penalties a person who “knowingly
and intentionally transports or moves an illegal alien in a motor vehicle for the purpose of
furthering the illegal presence of the alien,” or who “knowingly conceals, harbors, or
shields an illegal alien from detection in any place in [Georgia], including any building or
means of transportation, when such person knows that the person being concealed,
harbored, or shielded is an illegal alien”).
92 See, e.g., Act of June 9, 2011, No. 535, § 13(a)(4), 2011 Ala. Acts 888, 907 (repealed
2012) (criminalizing the renting of dwelling units to unlawfully present immigrants);
Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006–10 § 5(A) (July 13, 2006) (criminalizing entering into
rental agreements with unlawfully present immigrants), invalidated by Lozano v. City of
Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297 (3d. Cir. 2013); Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance 2903 § 3(B)(f)
(Jan. 22, 2007) (criminalizing entering into rental agreements with unlawfully present
immigrants), invalidated by Villas at Parkside v. City of Farmers Branch, 701 F. Supp. 2d
835 (N.D. Tex. 2010), aff’d, 726 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
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legislation has had in the federal courts,93 coupled with the
implementation of the executive program known as Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals,94 state immigration legislation
since 2012 has shifted its focus away from enforcement and
towards
protections
and
benefits
for
undocumented
immigrants.95
2. The Humanitarian Model
In direct contrast to the states that have passed the
measures discussed above, other states have passed laws
extending benefits to undocumented immigrants and protecting
them from certain forms of immigration enforcement. Provisions
include authorizing in-state tuition for undocumented
immigrants;96 extending eligibility for driver’s licenses to
undocumented
immigrants;97
allowing
undocumented
immigrants to practice law;98 and prohibiting state law
enforcement officers from engaging in certain enforcement
93 See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2503–07 (2012) (upholding the
invalidation of key provisions of S.B. 1040, including section 5(C), which criminalized
unlawful presence, and section 6, which authorized the warrantless arrest of lawfully
present noncitizens where probable cause existed that they had committed a deportable
offense).
94 See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to
David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Alejandro Mayorkas,
Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., and John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration
& Customs Enforcement (June 15, 2012) [hereinafter Janet Napolitano Memo], available
at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/s1-certain-young-people.pdf (instituting
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals).
95 MORSE ET AL., supra note 87, at 1.
96 See Table One: State Laws Allowing Undocumented College Students to Establish
Residency, 2014, U. HOUS . L. CENTER, http://www.law.uh.edu/ihelg/documents/Statute-Ta
bleOne.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (reporting that the following states currently
allow undocumented immigrants to pay in-state tuition: Texas, California, Utah, New
York, Washington, Illinois, Kansas, New Mexico, Nebraska, Maryland, Connecticut,
Rhode Island, Oregon, Colorado, Hawaii, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Florida).
97 See TANYA BRODER ET AL., NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., INCLUSIVE POLICIES
ADVANCE DRAMATICALLY IN THE STATES: IMMIGRANTS’ ACCESS TO DRIVER ’S LICENSES ,
HIGHER EDUCATION, WORKERS ’ R IGHTS, AND COMMUNITY POLICING 4 map (2013),
available at http://www.nilc.org/document.html?id=963 (reporting that Washington,
Oregon, California, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, Illinois, Vermont, Connecticut,
Maryland, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico provide access to driver’s licenses
regardless of immigration status, and that Kansas, Minnesota, Iowa, Indiana, Wisconsin,
Kentucky, Florida, Pennsylvania, New York, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Rhode
Island are considering doing so).
98 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6064 (West 2014) (authorizing bar admission for
unlawfully present immigrants in California); FLA. STAT. § 454.021 (2014) (authorizing
bar admission for undocumented immigrants in Florida who meet certain requirements);
S.B. 7879, 237th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2014) (proposing that undocumented immigrants
be admitted to law practice in New York); see also Wendi Adelson, Lawfully Present
Lawyers, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 387 (2015) (explaining the federal prohibition on issuing
professional licenses to undocumented immigrants absent specific authorization by state
law, and discussing the effect of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals on undocumented
DACA-eligible law school graduates).
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activities, such as detaining immigrants arrested for minor
crimes beyond the time at which they become eligible for release
in order to turn them over to federal immigration authorities.99
States that have adopted the humanitarian model recognize
that punitive measures targeting undocumented immigrants will
have little, if any, effect on the rate of unauthorized immigration.
In fact, nearly two million of today’s undocumented immigrants
are children and young adults who never had a choice about
coming to the United States.100 They arrived with their families
as children, grew up here, attended school here, and know no
other life.101 The reentry bars and absence of 245(i) are
particularly punitive and ineffective with respect to that group of
undocumented immigrants.
C. A Generation of DREAMers
One important difference between the undocumented
population in 1996 and the undocumented population of today is
the presence of a generation of children and young adults who
have grown up in the United States but have had no opportunity
to legalize. For the estimated 1.8 million “unauthorized
Americans” in the United States, there is no legalization
eligibility as there was for earlier unauthorized entrants under
previous immigrant statutes.102 They are thus in the unenviable
99 See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 7282, 7282.5 (West 2014) (prohibiting California law
enforcement officials from detaining an individual on the basis of an Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) hold after that individual becomes eligible for release from
custody, unless, at the time that the individual becomes eligible for release from custody,
certain conditions are met, including, among other things, that the individual has been
convicted of specified crimes); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-192h (2014) (prohibiting Connecticut
law enforcement officials from: holding an individual beyond the time when such
individual would otherwise be released from custody; notifying federal immigration
authorities of such individual’s release; or facilitating the individual’s transfer to ICE,
unless certain conditions apply; and prohibiting an ICE hold of more than twenty-four
hours under any circumstances); see also, Carrie L. Rosenbaum, The Role of Equality
Principles in Preemption Analysis of Sub-federal Immigration Laws: The California
TRUST Act, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 481 (2015) (providing an in-depth analysis of California’s
and Connecticut’s TRUST Acts, cited above).
100 See IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., WHO AND WHERE THE DREAMERS ARE, REVISED
ESTIMATES : A DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF IMMIGRANTS WHO MIGHT BENEFIT FROM THE
OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S DEFERRED ACTION INITIATIVE 1 (2012), available at
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/who_and_where_the_dreamers_a
re_two.pdf (estimating that 1.8 million undocumented immigrants meet the requirements
for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, which mirrors the requirements of the
DREAM Act: that the immigrant be under the age of thirty-one, have entered the United
States before age sixteen, have lived continuously in the country for at least five years,
have not been convicted of certain crimes, and be currently in school, have graduated from
high school, have earned a GED, or have served in the military).
101 Janet Napolitano Memorandum, supra note 94, at 1.
102 See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act § 249, 8 U.S.C. § 1259 (2012)
(permitting qualified persons who have resided continuously in the United States since
1972 to apply for lawful permanent residency); Immigration Reform and Control Act,
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position of having grown up socially as Americans but being
rejected legally as Americans.
These young undocumented immigrants are known as
“DREAMers,” a moniker reflecting their aspiration to qualify for
relief under the as yet unenacted Development, Relief and
Education for Alien Minors Act.103 They have grown up and been
educated in the United States, and thus absorbed U.S. culture to
the same degree as their legally present and U.S.-born peers.104
Despite their loyalty to the United States, dedication to the
democratic process, and courageous efforts to effect legislative
change, legalization remains elusive.105
Many DREAMers are members of “mixed-status” families, in
which at least one member is undocumented and one member is
a U.S. citizen or lawfully present immigrant.106 Their
relationship to a U.S. citizen or legally present immigrant,
however, does not afford them the ability to apply for adjustment
of status in the United States. Even though they did not, as
minor children, have the mens rea to effect an illegal entry into
8 U.S.C. § 1182 (permitting qualified persons who had resided continuously in the United
states since prior to January 1, 1982 to apply for lawful permanent residency);
Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat.
2193 (1997) (permitting qualified Central Americans and citizens of former Soviet States
to apply for adjustment of status, suspension of deportation, or cancellation of removal).
103 S. 3992, 111th Cong. § 1 (2010); see Michael A. Olivas, Dreams Deferred: Deferred
Action, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Vexing Case(s) of DREAM Act Students, 21
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 463, 463 (2012) (chronicling the most recent failed attempts to
pass the DREAM Act, which has been introduced in Congress almost annually since
2001).
104 See Michael A. Olivas, The Political Efficacy of Plyler v. Doe, 45 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1, 13 (2011) (“[T]he undocumented have every incentive to remain in the United
States, to adjust their status through formal or discretionary means, and to contribute to
the U.S. economy and polity. My own experiences over the years with these students have
shown them to be extremely loyal to the United States. Despite their undocumented
status, most are more Americanized than are many native born students. They believe in
the immigrant success story, having lived it in most instances . . . .”).
105 See Nataly Tavidian, Students Rally for DREAM Act Passage, 89.3 KPCC (Sept.
21, 2010), http://www.scpr.org/news/2010/09/21/19419/students-rally-dream-act-passage/
(reporting that dozens of undocumented students spoke at a September 2010 rally in Los
Angeles, urging federal lawmakers to pass the DREAM Act); Jason Linkins, DREAM Act
Rally in Tucson: Four Detained, HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 2011, 4:30 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/18/dream-act-rally-in-tucson_n_580733.html (reporting
that in May 2010, a group of Arizona undocumented students led a sit-in at the offices of
Senator John McCain to urge him to support the DREAM Act); Young Illegal Immigrants
Rally in Downtown L.A. to Support Dream Act, L.A. NOW (June 15, 2012, 11:10 AM),
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/06/young-illegal-immigrants-rally-in-downtow
n-la-to-support-dream-act.html (reporting that in June 2012, DREAMers rallied in Los
Angeles to support the DREAM Act and President Barack Obama’s decision to halt
removal proceedings and deportations of DREAM Act-eligible immigrants).
106 See PAUL TAYLOR ET AL., PEW HISPANIC CTR., UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS:
LENGTHS OF RESIDENCY, PATTERNS OF PARENTHOOD 6 (2011) (estimating that 9 million
people are members of mixed status families, and that 400,000 undocumented immigrant
children have U.S. citizen siblings).
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the United States, the law does not provide an exception for
minors; they are thus ineligible to apply for adjustment of status
in the United States. Moreover, they began accumulating
unlawful presence the day after they turned eighteen107 and are
consequently subject to the three- and ten-year bars once they
depart the United States.
Considering the significant increase in unauthorized
immigration since the enactment of IIRIRA, the states’
disapproval of current immigration law and enforcement, and the
growing number of fully acculturated but nevertheless
undocumented children and young adults, it seems reasonable to
conclude that IIRIRA has not achieved its goals and is
particularly ineffective with respect to today’s generation of
undocumented immigrants. This realization should encourage a
sea change in immigration law and policy, but that does not seem
to be forthcoming. At the very least, however, the law should be
amended to respect the fundamental life choices of U.S. citizens.
IV. 245(i) SHOULD BE PERMANENTLY REINSTATED
Despite the obvious failure of current immigration law,
comprehensive immigration reform is not on the horizon. It is
possible for reform to occur piecemeal, which might be the
preferable way to proceed given the vast ignorance surrounding
immigration and the resulting “emotionalization” of what is, in
the end, primarily an economic issue. If true comprehensive
immigration reform remains elusive, and legislators and
policymakers single out discrete areas of immigration law for
reform, permanently reinstating 245(i) should be the priority.
Other niche areas of immigration law are also in dire need of
reform, such as asylum (especially the one-year deadline)108 and
detention (particularly of children, families, and asylum
seekers).109 The reentry bars, however, stand out as provisions
that disproportionately impact the United States’ closest
neighbors and interfere with the fundamental life choices of
U.S. citizens, and in the end are not an effective deterrent for

Immigration and Nationality Act § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(iii)–(iv).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (requiring applicants for asylum to file within one
year of entering the United States); see also Philip G. Schrag & Michelle R. Pistone, The
New Asylum Rule: Not Yet a Model of Fair Procedure, 11 GEO . IMMIGR . L.J. 267, 268
(1997) (criticizing the one-year deadline, among other changes that IIRIRA made to the
asylum process).
109 See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (mandating the detention of asylum applicants
apprehended at a port of entry); 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (mandating the detention of certain
noncitizens convicted of deportable crimes); see also LEADERSHIP C ONFERENCE ON CIVIL
RIGHTS EDUC. FUND & AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, AMERICAN JUSTICE
THROUGH IMMIGRANTS’ EYES 59 (2004) (criticizing mandatory detention laws).
107
108
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marriage fraud or unauthorized immigration. Reinstating 245(i)
is a simple solution to a problem of significant proportions for
many U.S. citizens and their families.110
A. The Reentry Bars Target Undocumented Immigrants but
Ignore Visa Violators, Disproportionately Affecting U.S. Citizen
Family Members of Mexican and Central American Immigrants
There are two ways in which an immigrant may fall into the
status of “undocumented”: by entering the United States without
inspection, or by overstaying a visa. Approximately fifty-five
percent of undocumented immigrants entered the United States
without inspection; the remaining forty-five percent have
overstayed a visa.111 Despite the fact that undocumented
immigrants who entered without inspection do not form an
overwhelming percentage of the undocumented population, they
are overwhelmingly prejudiced by the reentry bars and the
unavailability of 245(i).
As discussed at length above, the reentry bars only apply to
those noncitizens who do not apply for adjustment of status in
the United States but rather seek an immigrant visa through
consular processing abroad.112 The prohibition on adjusting
status in the United States only applies to applicants who did not
effect a legal entry into the United States. If an undocumented
immigrant entered legally, overstayed her or his visa by any
length of time, and even worked and continues to work without
authorization, she or he is nevertheless eligible to adjust her or
his status in the United States as the beneficiary of a spousal
petition filed by a U.S. citizen.113
The law’s targeting of noncitizens who entered the United
States without inspection has a disparate negative impact on
Latinos and persons of lower socioeconomic status. First, most
entries without inspection are occurring at the U.S. border with
Mexico, predominantly by Mexicans and Central Americans.114
110 See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., supra note 80, at 3 and
accompanying text (indicating that at least 24,000 families are currently affected by the
unavailability of 245(i)).
111 PEW HISPANIC CTR., MODES OF ENTRY FOR THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT
POPULATION 1 (2006); see also id. at 2 (“[T]he annual flow of new unauthorized migrants
is almost evenly divided between those who enter legally and those who do not.”).
112 See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (rendering aliens who entered without inspection ineligible
for adjustment of status); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A) (rendering aliens who entered without
inspection inadmissible).
113 See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (authorizing aliens who were inspected and admitted into
the United States to apply for adjustment of status); 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c) (exempting
immediate relatives of U.S. citizens from ineligibility for adjustment based on unlawful
presence or unauthorized employment).
114 See PEW HISPANIC CTR., supra note 111, at 4.
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Second, in order to obtain a nonimmigrant visa to the United
States, the applicant must provide a travel itinerary,
demonstrate financial ability to make the trip, and provide
assurance (such as proof of employment) that she or he intends to
return to the home country.115 Thus, a foreign national who is
employed and can afford a trip for pleasure to the United States
can secure a visa, overstay for decades, and never be subject to
the reentry bars; but a working-class Mexican or Central
American who arrived without inspection will be ineligible for
adjustment of status and subject to the reentry bars, despite the
fact that her or his U.S. citizen spouse is responsible for ensuring
that she or he does not become a public charge.116
This seems particularly unjust with respect to the DREAMer
population, many of whom did not choose to come to the United
States and others of whom were compelled by desire to be with
parents and siblings.117 While many visa overstays conceivably
had the intent to remain in the United States at the time they
applied for their visas, many DREAMers never had or acted upon
an intent to deceive U.S. immigration or consular officials; and
yet it is the DREAMer, not the visa overstay, who is subject to
the reentry bars.
Above all, the reentry bars and unavailability of 245(i) have
a harsh impact on U.S. citizens. The undocumented immigrant
who faces the possibility of a three- or ten-year bar to reentry is
an illegally present alien in the eyes of the law, but is a husband
or wife to a U.S. citizen and a mother or father to U.S. citizen
children. Thus, for every one undocumented immigrant who is
ineligible for adjustment of status, there is an entire family of
U.S. citizens who must live with the stress, expense, upheaval,
and uncertainty that the reentry bars create. There is a strong
argument that such interference with fundamental life choices
violates the Constitution.

115 Visitor Visa, U.S. VISAS, http://travel.state.gov/content/visas/english/visit/visitor.
html#documentation (last visited Sept. 25, 2014).
116 See 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(1), (3) (contractually obligating sponsors of aliens “to
provide support to maintain the sponsored alien at an annual income that is not less than
125 percent of the Federal poverty line” for forty quarters).
117 See WILLIAM PEREZ, WE ARE AMERICANS: UNDOCUMENTED STUDENTS PURSUING
THE AMERICAN DREAM, at xviii (2009) (noting that most DREAMers were brought to the
United States as infants).
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B. The Reentry Bars and Unavailability of 245(i) Are
Inconsistent with the Due Process Clause Right to Marry,
Establish a Home, and Raise Children
The three- and ten-year bars, combined with the
unavailability of 245(i), constitute a significant imposition on a
U.S. citizen’s right to marry. The laws in effect dictate to a
U.S. citizen who chooses to marry an undocumented immigrant
that the U.S. citizen must be prepared to live outside the United
States or endure a painful separation if a waiver of the reentry
bars is not available. The only alternative to expatriation or
separation is living in a mixed-status situation, with the U.S.
citizen spouse and children enduring the precariousness, stress,
and financial consequences attendant to undocumented status.
Although a full discourse on the right to marry is beyond the
scope of this Article, a brief discussion illuminates the
questionable nature of the reentry bars with respect to that
issue.118
Challenges to laws and regulatory schemes involving
marriage arise in many contexts and take various forms.
Generally, they range from cases in which marital status dictates
an individual’s or family’s rights to some form of public benefit,119
to those in which an individual’s or couple’s right to marry is at
issue.120 If the law, regulation, or policy does not directly and
substantially interfere with the right to marry, courts apply
rational basis review, evaluating whether it is rationally related
to a legitimate governmental interest.121
Cases typically evaluated under rational basis review involve
the termination of benefits or employment because of
118 For an in-depth discussion of the erosion of the right to marriage and family as a
result of Congress’s plenary power over immigration, see Linda Kelly, Preserving the
Fundamental Right to Family Unity: Championing Notions of Social Contract and
Community Ties in the Battle of Plenary Power Versus Aliens’ Rights, 41 VILL. L. REV. 725
(1996).
119 See, e.g., Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977) (addressing the question of whether
Congress has the power to require that a dependent child’s social security benefits
terminate upon marriage even though he is permanently disabled).
120 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (addressing the constitutionality of
anti-miscegenation laws).
121 See, e.g., Califano, 434 U.S. 47 (applying rational basis review to the question of
whether Congress has the power to require that a dependent child’s social security
benefits terminate upon marriage even though he is permanently disabled);
Smith v. Shalala, 5 F.3d 235 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying rational basis review to the
question of whether a statute conferring marriage onto unmarried cohabitants for
purposes of determining whether they are eligible for disability benefits violates their
freedom to choose to marry); Bautista v. Cnty. of L.A., 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 714 (Cal. Ct. App.
2010) (applying rational basis review to the issue of whether termination pursuant to a
policy prohibiting police officers from personally associating with suspects or known
criminals violated the plaintiff’s right to intimate association).
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marriage: the legislature or employer has not prohibited
marriage, but the law or policy substantially impacts the decision
to marry by disadvantaging certain married couples. Examples
include anti-nepotism policies, which place restrictions on
spouses working for the same employer,122 and the denial of
certain public benefits upon marriage.123 Courts have routinely
found that such laws and policies are rationally related to
legitimate interests and thus reside within constitutional
bounds.124
The Supreme Court took a very different approach when it
examined a statute that impacted a family’s ability to reside
together. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,125 the Supreme
Court struck down a municipal code that prohibited certain
family members from living together in a single dwelling. The
Court cautioned that “when the government intrudes on choices
concerning family living arrangements, this Court must examine
carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced
and the extent to which they are served by the challenged
regulation.”126 The Court found that the ordinance served
“marginally, at best,” the concededly legitimate governmental
interests of “preventing overcrowding, minimizing traffic and

122 See, e.g., Parks v. City of Warner Robins, Ga., 43 F.3d 609 (11th Cir. 1995)
(applying rational basis review in evaluating the constitutionality of a policy prohibiting
relatives of city employees in a supervisory position from working in the same
department); Waters v. Gaston Cnty., N.C., 57 F.3d 422 (4th Cir. 1995) (applying rational
basis review in evaluating the constitutionality of a policy prohibiting spouses from
working in the same department); Montgomery v. Carr, 101 F.3d 1117 (6th Cir. 1996)
(applying rational basis review in evaluating the constitutionality of a policy prohibiting
married teachers from working at the same school).
123 See, e.g., Califano, 434 U.S. 47 (applying rational basis review to the question of
whether Congress has the power to require that a dependent child’s social security
benefits terminate upon marriage even though he is permanently disabled); Shalala,
5 F.3d 235 (applying rational basis review to the question of whether a statute conferring
marriage onto unmarried cohabitants for purposes of determining whether they are
eligible for disability benefits violates their freedom to choose to marry).
124 See, e.g., Califano, 434 U.S. at 58 (upholding the termination of a dependent
child’s social security benefits upon marriage even though he was permanently disabled);
Shalala, 5 F.3d at 240 (upholding a statute conferring marriage onto unmarried
cohabitants for purposes of determining whether they are eligible for disability benefits);
Bautista, 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 720–21 (upholding the termination of a police officer after
his marriage to a prostitute, finding that a policy prohibiting police officers from
personally associating with suspects or known criminals did not interfere with the right to
marry); Parks, 43 F.3d at 618 (upholding a policy prohibiting relatives of city employees
in a supervisory position from working in the same department); Waters, 57 F.3d at 427
(upholding a policy prohibiting spouses from working in the same department);
Montgomery, 101 F.3d at 1118 (upholding a policy prohibiting married teachers from
working at the same school).
125 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
126 Id. at 499.
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parking congestion, and avoiding an undue financial burden on
East Cleveland’s school system.”127
The situation created by ineligibility for adjustment of status
and subjection to the reentry bars is more analogous to the Moore
case than to those dealing with employment and benefits. The
laws intrude on choices concerning family living arrangements by
forcing U.S. citizens either to live apart from their undocumented
family members or to leave their rightful country and live
abroad. As discussed in other parts of this Article,128 the laws
serve marginally, at best, the government interests of deterring
and punishing unauthorized immigration. Thus, although the
laws do not specifically prohibit certain family relationships or
living arrangements, the impact the laws have on mixed-status
families is severe and unmitigated by furtherance of government
interests.
C. The Reentry Bars Do Not Deter Illegal Immigration, nor
Would the Reinstatement of 245(i) Encourage Illegality
A final reason for reinstating 245(i) is that its absence has
proven not to be an effective deterrent against illegal
immigration. As discussed at length above, migration patterns
rarely respond to laws but almost always respond to economics.
In the case of the United States and the countries from which the
majority of undocumented immigrants hail, there is the
additional factor of family unification immigrants, or those who
entered not in response to economic factors but because they
were brought or sent for by their families as infants and young
children.
Immigration statistics since the 1996 promulgation of the
reentry bars demonstrate their inefficacy. In 1996, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service estimated that 5 million
undocumented immigrants resided in the United States.129
Today, that number has grown to over 11 million.130 Fluctuations
within that time period track economic conditions on both sides
of the Mexico/U.S. border.131

Id. at 499–500.
See supra Parts IV.A, IV.C, and infra Part V.C.
IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., supra note 71, at 199.
MICHAEL HOEFER ET AL ., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP ’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED
STATES: JANUARY 2011, at 1 (2012).
131 See HANS JOHNSON & LAURA HILL, PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., ILLEGAL
IMMIGRATION fig.2 (2011), available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/atissue/
AI_711HJAI.pdf (providing graphical illustration of the correlation between U.S.
economic conditions and unauthorized immigration).
127
128
129
130
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Despite the proven inefficacy of the reentry bars as a
deterrent against illegal immigration, opponents of reinstating
245(i) argue that it rewards lawbreakers and encourages illegal
immigration.132 This argument contains several flaws. First, the
vast majority of undocumented immigrants did not enter the
United States with the intention of marrying U.S. citizens; in
fact, many are married to non-U.S. citizens. Rather, they entered
the United States to work. It is therefore unlikely that the
United States’ policy regarding the adjustment of status of
undocumented immigrants married to U.S. citizens has much, if
any, impact on migration patterns.
Second, the argument disregards the fact that the
punishment—if punishment were even a legitimate concern in
the area of immigration—is inflicted on U.S. citizen family
members at least to the same degree as the undocumented
immigrant.133 It is the U.S. citizen who is denied the ability to
live with the spouse of her or his choice in her or his rightful
country. If such a denial of basic rights were at least effective,
the flaw in this argument might be overlooked. Viewed in the
context of the law’s indisputable inefficacy, however, the
disregard for U.S. citizens’ fundamental life choices is
insupportable.134
Finally, as intimated above, immigration laws intended to
punish economic migrants are inherently flawed. They represent
an emotional response to a situation that, albeit emotional in
many respects, was born of and is powered by economics.135 In
essence, laws such as the reentry bars attempt to send a message
to persons who entered or are considering entering the United
States illegally: if you break the law to come to the United States,
there will be consequences. But economics are sending much
louder and more powerful messages to those same immigrants or
intending immigrants: the United States desperately needs your
labor; your home country cannot pay you a living wage for your
labor; you will be better able to feed, clothe, and educate your
children if you come to the United States. Technical laws such as
132 See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. 16,715 (2001) (“[W]e are, for hundreds of thousands of
people, going to be basically granting them the right to amnesty without going to their
home country to legalize their status. This does nothing but encourage the millions, and
we are talking about tens of millions, of people who are standing in line throughout the
world waiting to come into this country legally so they can become citizens; but we have
done nothing but encourage them to come here illegally, to reward the law-breakers, and
to punish those people who are following the law.”).
133 See supra Parts I.C, IV.B (discussing the impact of the reentry bars on U.S.
citizens).
134 See supra Part III.A (discussing the inefficacy of the reentry bars with respect to
decreasing illegal immigration).
135 See supra Part III.A (discussing the economics of immigration).

Do Not Delete

2015]

2/15/2015 8:56 PM

Seventeen Years Since the Sunset

479

the reentry bars, even if intending immigrants knew of them and
understood their effects, are irrelevant in the face of such
messages. To impose them as a punishment serves only to
assuage those unable or unwilling to understand what actually
compels indigent foreign nationals to migrate.
CONCLUSION
Sufficient time has passed since the sunsetting of 245(i) for
lawmakers to accept the fact that the reentry bars and inability
of certain undocumented immigrants to apply for adjustment of
status in the United States have not curtailed illegal
immigration. During that time, the burden that the reentry bars
place on U.S. citizen family members of undocumented
immigrants has become apparent. As violence has escalated in
northern Mexico, the financial burden has been eclipsed by the
danger that U.S. citizens and their family members must face in
order to complete the lengthy ordeal of consular processing.
Many of the undocumented immigrants potentially and actually
affected by the reentry bars are Americanized DREAMers with
significant ties and loyalty to the United States. Above all, the
rate of illegal immigration has continued to reflect economic
trends, increasing and decreasing according to economic
conditions on both sides of the border. In light of the significant
hardship that the reentry bars and unavailability of 245(i)
impose on U.S. citizens, and their ineffectiveness in decreasing
illegal immigration, it is time for 245(i) to be permanently
reinstated.
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